Journal of Civil Law Studies
Volume 7

Number 1

Article 2

10-29-2014

Law and the Lodestar: Tunisian Civil Law and the Task of Ordering
Plurality in the Aftermath of the Jasmine Revolution
Dan E. Stigall

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls
Part of the Civil Law Commons

Repository Citation
Dan E. Stigall, Law and the Lodestar: Tunisian Civil Law and the Task of Ordering Plurality in the Aftermath
of the Jasmine Revolution, 7 J. Civ. L. Stud. (2014)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol7/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU Law
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

LAW AND THE LODESTAR: TUNISIAN CIVIL LAW AND
THE TASK OF ORDERING PLURALITY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE JASMINE REVOLUTION
Dan E. Stigall ∗
I. Introduction ................................................................................. 2
II. Tunisian Law and its Strategic Context ..................................... 5
A. Tunisian Legal History: A Brief Overview ......................... 10
B. David Santillana and the Synthesis of Civil Law and Islamic
Law in Tunisia ..................................................................... 13
III. The Tunisian Code of Obligations and Contracts ................... 16
A. Sources of Law .................................................................... 17
B. Formation of Obligations and Contracts .............................. 20
1. Unilateral Acts .................................................................. 22
2. Contracts (Bilateral Acts).................................................. 23
C. Transfer of Obligations ........................................................ 24
D. Extinction of Obligations ..................................................... 26
1. Remission of Debt............................................................. 27
2. Novation ............................................................................ 28
3. Compensation ................................................................... 29
4. Confusion .......................................................................... 30
E. Vices of Consent .................................................................. 31
∗ Dan E. Stigall is an attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice, Office
of International Affairs, where he serves as Coordinator for International
Security Affairs. He previously served on active duty in the U.S. Army JAG
Corps from 2001-2009, serving in Europe, the Middle East, and the United
States. LL.M., 2009, George Washington University School of Law; J.D., 2000,
Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center; B.A., 1996, Louisiana
State University. Any opinion expressed in this Article is solely that of the
author and not necessarily that of the Department of Defense or the Department
of Justice.
The author would like to thank Sana Bhar, his colleague with the
Tunisian Ministry of Justice, for her assistance with research related to this
article—and all his Tunisian colleagues who have shown such dedication and
skill in confronting myriad complex legal issues in the aftermath of the
revolution. The author also wishes, on the occasion of her retirement, to thank
Mary Ellen “Molly” Warlow, an international lawyer of the highest order, for
her insight, assistance, and encouragement.

2

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 7

1. Error .................................................................................. 32
2. Violence ............................................................................ 32
3. Fraud ................................................................................. 33
4. Additional Bases for Rescission ....................................... 34
F. Contract of Sale .................................................................... 34
G. Contract of Exchange ........................................................... 40
H. Deposit and Sequestration.................................................... 41
I. Mandate ................................................................................. 43
J. Oaths (Les Serments) ............................................................. 44
K. Mouçakâte and Moughâraça ................................................ 46
IV. Conclusion .............................................................................. 48

I. INTRODUCTION
As the Tunisian Constituent Assembly voted on the provisions
of its new post-revolution constitution, international media
reports—noting that the new constitution contains no express
reference to Islamic law—ebulliently declared that Tunisia had
rejected Islamic law and embraced secular civil law. 1 Shortly
thereafter, on the same day the rhapsodic headlines were printed,
the deliberation on the Tunisian constitution was suspended “after
a deputy claimed he had received death threats because a colleague
had accused him of being an ‘enemy of Islam.’” 2 The issue of
whether or not the Tunisian constitution would reference Islamic
law had, throughout the preceding year, been the focus of intense
and acrimonious debate within Tunisia and among international
actors with an interest in Tunisia’s post-revolution transition to
1. See RT, Tunisia opts for civil, not Sharia law as assembly votes on new
constitution (Jan 5, 2014), http://rt.com/news/tunisia-rejects-islam-law-196/; see
also AAP, Tunisia's assembly has rejected Islam as the main source of law as it
voted on a new constitution (January 5, 2014): “Tunisia's Islamist-dominated
constituent assembly has compromised in rejecting Islam as the main source of
law as it voted on a new constitution for the country that spawned the Arab
spring.http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/01/05/tunisia-mps-reject-islamlaw”
2. See Tunisia MPs reject Islam as law, supra note 1.
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democracy. 3 Therefore, when the new constitution omitted
mention of Islamic law, it was viewed in certain circles as a
triumph of progressive liberalism and, in others, a defeat of Islamic
legal principles. 4 This article, in analyzing the domestic civil law
in force in Tunisia, posits that, with regard to Tunisian civil law,
neither conclusion is entirely true. 5 To the contrary, for well over a
century, Tunisian civil law, a “mixed” civil law system which
incorporates elements of continental civil law derived from
European codes with Islamic law and Tunisian custom, has
regulated the ordinary affairs of Tunisians in a manner that is
consistent with both modern legal norms and the tenets of Islamic
law. 6
Illuminating this hybridity in Tunisian civil law is useful on a
number of levels. From an academic perspective, in the context of
Middle Eastern and North African civil law systems, recent
scholarship (quite rightly) has focused on the work of Abd alRazzaq Al-Sanhūrī, among the most accomplished comparative
lawyers of the twentieth century 7 and the chief architect of many
civil codes for countries in the Middle East and North Africa who

3. Aziz El Yaakoubi, Death threats disrupt Tunisia constitution debate,
Reuters, Jan 5, 2014: “Since the 2011 uprising, tensions over the role of Islam in
Tunisia and the assassination of two secular politicians by hardline Islamist
militants last year have widened divisions between Islamists and secular
parties.”
4. Id.
5. For an interesting discussion regarding the relevancy of such a clause,
known as a repugnancy clause, see Haider Ala Hamoudi, Repugnancy in the
Arab World, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 427, 427 (2012).
6. There are numerous schools of Islamic law (or madhabs). Although the
Maliki madhab prevails in Tunisia, see HALIM RANE, ISLAM AND
CONTEMPORARY CIVILISATION 83 (2010), the Hanifi madhab is also very
significant. Other minority madhabs, such as the Ibāḍī madhab, can also be
found in Tunisia. See, generally, J.H. van Riel, The Ibāḍī Traders of Bilād alSūdān (Master’s thesis, The American University in Cairo, School of
Humanities and Social Sciences, 2012). As this article will demonstrate, in those
areas where it draws on Islamic law, the Tunisian Code of Obligations and
Contracts draws most significantly from the Maliki and Hanafi madhabs.
7. See Amr Shalakany, Sanhuri and the Historical Origins of Comparative
Law in the Arab World (or How Sometimes Losing Your Asalah can be Good for
You) in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 152 (2001).
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were achieving independence in the aftermath of World War I. 8
Sanhūrī’s work is notable for its masterful synthesis of European
and Islamic legal principles and has come to serve as the archetype
for Middle Eastern civil codes. 9 The Tunisian civil code, however,
is an interesting example of North African legislation which
predates Sanhūrī and which also seeks to reconcile Islamic law
with continental civil law based on European codifications 10—and
a model which has influenced subsequent codifications in North
Africa and the Sahel, specifically in Morocco and Mauritania. 11
The Tunisian legal experience, therefore, represents the genesis of
a unique version of Middle Eastern and North African legal
codification.
In addition, an understanding of Tunisian civil law can inform
analysis of the current political situation in Tunisia as many of the
ongoing post-revolution debates have revolved around the role of

8. Id.
9. Id. It is worth noting that continental civil law has always demonstrated
a unique capacity to be exported and assimilated into other legal milieus. Since
the advent of the modern civil code, civil law jurists (and comparativists) in
various places throughout the world have acted as “synthesists,” working to
create a civil code based on the French model but retaining a sufficient degree of
organic legal substance so as to be faithful to the legal traditions of the
jurisdiction. These “synthesists” include the Haitian-born Louisiana jurist, Louis
Casimir Elisabeth Moreau-Lislet, who, as early as 1806, along with another
jurist named James Brown, was charged with creating a civil code for what was
then called “the Territory of Orleans.” See ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LOUIS
CASIMIR ELISABETH MOREAU LISLET, FATER OF LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 80
(1996). As Professor Alain Levasseur demonstrates in his illuminative book on
the topic, Moreau-Lislet was given the task of creating a civil code based on the
laws in force in Louisiana at that time, the substance of which was Spanish in
origin. He was charged with this duty almost contemporaneously with the
promulgation of the Code Napoléon. Id. at 64. To accomplish this task, MoreauLislet was perhaps the first civil law jurist to synthesize the French civil code
with non-French law (the Spanish law that was at that time in force). In this
effort, “[a]nterior laws were repealed, so far only as they were contrary to or
irreconcilable with any of the provisions of the new.” Id. at 65. Such a method is
akin to the method used in crafting Tunisian civil law.
10. See Mohamed Kamel Charfeggine, Présentation in LIVRE DU
CENTENAIRE DU CODE DES OBLIGATIONS ET DES CONTRATS 1906-2006
(Mohamed Kamel Charfeggine ed., 2006).
11. See Id.
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Islamic law in Tunisian society. 12 Understanding how Tunisian
civil law accommodates Islamic law can render the analysis of
such debates more meaningful by revealing the degree to which
constitutional references to Islamic law actually influence the
presence or absence of Islamic legal influence in contemporary
Tunisian legislation. A review of that legislation and its history
presents a far richer and more nuanced view of Tunisian law and
its sources and, importantly, gives reason for Tunisians of all
political and ideological stripes to find a measure of accord and
acceptance of their civil laws and their legal and philosophical
lineage.
II. TUNISIAN LAW AND ITS STRATEGIC CONTEXT
The past decade or so has witnessed a marked increase in the
attention paid to legal systems in the Middle East and North
Africa. 13 Wars, revolutions, and the increasingly expeditionary
foreign policies of western governments in the 21st century (which
viewed foreign instability as a threat to domestic national security)
have drawn the study of these legal systems into the foreign policy
calculus of major countries seeking to promote stability or
otherwise assert influence in the region. 14 Most recently, the
challenges faced by countries in the region in the aftermath of the
12. See Library of Congress, The Role of Islamic Law in Tunisia’s
Constitution and Legislation Post-Arab Spring (Jan 31, 2014),
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/tunisia.php.
13. See CHIBLI MALLAT, IRAQ: GUIDE TO LAW AND POLICY XXI (2009):“A
search in American and British law journals yielded 250 entries for articles and
notes on Iraq since 2003. There was hardly a tenth that number over the
previous 50 years.” See also University of London SOAS,
http://www.soas.ac.uk/cimel/: “The Centre of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law
was established in 1990 at the School of Oriental and African Studies in
recognition of the growing importance of law in both its Islamic and Middle
Eastern dimensions.”
14. For a discussion of the link between comparative law and stability
operations carried out by U.S. armed forces, see Dan E. Stigall, Comparative
Law and Stability Operations: A Basic Overview and a Few Thoughts on
Lésion,
Comparativelawblog
(21
May,
2010),
available
at
http://comparativelawblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/comparative-law-andstability.html.
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Arab Spring are beginning to draw attention to the legal systems of
North Africa and the Levant. 15 This is, in part, because the
deleterious effect of that series of revolutions on the domestic
institutions of affected countries has made those countries more
prone to “destabilizing ethnic and sectarian rivalries” 16 and “have
created opportunities for extremist groups to find ungoverned
space from which to destabilize the new governments and prepare
attacks against Western interests inside those countries.” 17 A major
issue of concern for these various regions is the way in which law
and legal institutions can effectively address the needs of
heterogeneous and pluralistic societies which must co-exist in the
context of a unified legal and national framework. 18 This is
especially true in those countries which are currently crafting new
constitutions, writing new legislation, and wrestling with the
complex issues associated with the proper role of religion and
religious law. 19 But such legal harmonization is a challenge at

15. See Islamic Law in Transitioning Arab Spring Countries Subject of June
4 Program, http://www.loc.gov/today/pr/2013/13-091.html (noting that the Law
Library of Congress and the Library’s African and Middle Eastern Division
hosted a panel discussion on the role and impact of Islamic law in the
developing constitutions and laws of transitioning countries in the Middle
East/North Africa region in 2013.).
16. See Woodrow Wilson Center, U.S. Intelligence: Arab Spring Generated
Threats (March 15, 2013), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/islamists/article/usintelligence-arab-spring-generated-threats.
17. Id.
18. See Lally Weymouth, The Arab Spring’s Last Hope: An interview with
Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of Tunisia’s largest political party,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2013/12/rachid_gha
nnouchi_interview_the_tunisian_leader_of_the_ennahda_party_on.html
(quoting Rachid Ghannouchi as saying: “I believe that Tunisia will be successful
in presenting a successful democratic model because we have a homogenous
society, with a small Jewish minority.”) See also Euro-Mediterranean Network
for Human Rights, The Reform of Judiciaries in the Wake of the Arab Spring,
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/515009ac2.pdf (“The ‘Arab Spring’ is not only
‘Arab’. Due regard should be given to the role and contribution of the different
ethnic and linguistic minorities in the region, such as Amazigh, Kurds, and
many others who equally participated in the democratic uprising.”).
19. See Clark Lombardi, Fierce Contest: Constitutional Islam and the Arab
Spring,
World
Politics
Review,
08
October,
2013,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13280/fierce-contestconstitutional-islam-and-the-arab-spring: “The struggle between liberals and
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every level. As Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty notes: “Ordering
multiplicity without reducing it to sameness, admitting pluralism
without giving up on building common law with a common
measure for fair and unfair, can therefore seem an unattainable
goal.” 20
Developments in Tunisia are of particular interest due to the
fact that Tunisia, more than any other country in the region, is
emerging as a model for Arab Spring countries seeking a
successful transition to democracy. Tunisia, after all, was the
genesis and the epicenter of the Arab Spring (which began as the
“Jasmine Revolution”). 21 While outcomes throughout the region
have varied, in the aftermath of those tremorous spasms of discord
and political upheaval, commentators have noted Tunisia’s
relatively successful transition from autocracy. 22 This success is
due, in no small part, to the fact that Tunisia experienced a regime
change but retained its vital state institutions 23 and has, throughout
its process of transition, maintained relative (though imperfect)
stability whereas neighboring countries have not. 24 As a result,
Tunisia’s very real potential for success has redefined it on the

conservative Islamists often intensifies when constitutions are being drafted or
amended. The Arab Spring has thus ushered in an era of fierce contest.”
20. See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, ORDERING PLURALISM: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL WORLD 1
(2009).
21. See Tunisia and Democratic Transition, Global Brief (March 9, 2011).
22. See Judy Woodruff, Tunisia, birthplace of the Arab Spring, struggles to
reset
its
democracy,
PBS,
November
23,
2013,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec13/tunisia_11-25.html.
23. See QUERINE HANLON, THE PROSPECTS FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
IN TUNISIA: A YEAR AFTER THE REVOLUTION 5 (U.S. Army War College,
Strategic Studies Institute, September 2012).
24. See Aziz El Yaakoubi, Tunisia starts voting on new constitution,
Reuters, Fri Jan 3, 2014: “[Tunisia's] final steps to full democracy have been
widely watched as a possible model in a region where Egypt, Libya and Yemen,
which also ousted their leaders in 2011, are struggling with violence and
instability as well as resurgent Islamism.”
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world stage as a regional anchor, a lodestar for countries in
transition, and “the Arab Spring’s last hope.” 25
Central to Tunisia’s transition from autocracy to democracy is
the question of what law will apply and the sources from which
that law is to be derived. 26 The major focus of analysis and debate
in this regard has been on Tunisia’s new constitution,27 which,
after intense national debate, was formulated without reference to
Islamic law as a source of law. 28 Very little attention, however, has
been paid to the domestic civil law in force in Tunisia and the
sources of that law, the analysis of which demonstrates that Islamic
law remains part of Tunisian civil law. 29 While the retention of
Islamic law in the Tunisian legal corpus is most evident in its
Personal Status Code, which is based on a progressive
interpretation of Islamic law and Tunisian custom, 30 Islamic law is
25. See Weymouth, supra note 18.
26. See Asma Ghribi, Role of Islamic Law in Tunisian Constitution
Provokes Debate, Tunisialive, 22 March 2012,
www.tunisia-live.net/2012/03/22/role-of-islamic-law-in-tunisian-constitutionprovokes-debate/#sthash.mgLeAjgP.dpuf.
27. See Aziz El Yaakoubi, supra note 24.
28. Heba Saleh, Tunisia finalises new constitution, FT.com, January 24,
2014,http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b029551a-8498-11e3-b72e00144feab7de.html#axzz3FDLndjuM: “The document says that Islam is the
religion of the Tunisian state, but makes no mention at all of Islamic sharia law.”
29. See Lombardi, supra note 19:
The [Ennahda] party thus supported the adoption of a constitution that
did not explicitly require the constitution to respect Islam—preferring
to ensure that the constitution left room for Islamists to take power and
impose laws that reflected their understanding of Islam. Ennahda
appears, in fact, to favor a fairly liberal understanding of Islam, but one
could imagine a more conservative group taking a similar path.
See also Thousands rally demanding sharia law in Tunisia, AFP, Mar 16, 2012.
30. See Jane Adas, Tunisia’s Personal Status Code and Modernity
(Development and Human Rights, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,
March 2007), at 42-43 (noting that “[e]lements of the code were promulgated in
a 1939 draft based on Islamic canon law under the Ottoman Bey, when Tunisia
was still under French control,” and that:
Mohamed Habib Cherif, minister of justice and human rights, observed
that the Personal Status Code is deeply anchored in Tunisian society,
where women have been an important presence since Queen Dido
founded Carthage. The godfather of the Personal Status Code was
Tunisian reformist scholar Tahar Haddad, who in 1930 published Our
Women in Religion and Society. Elements of the code were
promulgated in a 1939 draft based on Islamic canon law under the
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also firmly entrenched in the ordinary civil law which regulates the
daily transactions of Tunisian citizens. Importantly, however, an
analysis of Tunisian civil law also demonstrates that the presence
of Islamic legal influence in Tunisian civil law has not been a
negative aspect or a harmful element, nor has Islamic law’s
presence in Tunisian civil law over the past century served to
significantly alter the physiognomy of Tunisian society into
something unrecognizable to Western secular sensibilities. To the
contrary, the Tunisian code demonstrates how Islamic law can
function in a modern context alongside continental civil law as part
of a mixed jurisdiction in which domestic civil law is derived from
a multiplicity of sources. 31
This article, therefore, provides a focused analysis on Tunisian
civil law and its role in post-revolution Tunisia, specifically
focusing on the Tunisian Code of Obligations and Contracts,
which, since its promulgation in 1906, has been described as “the
first durable codification of Tunisian civil law.” 32 Through an
analysis of the history, sources, and operation of Tunisian civil

Ottoman Bey, when Tunisia was still under French control. The 1956
Code, Cherif said, erased discriminatory traditions, such as customary
marriage and secret divorce, and reformed the judiciary by replacing
the Islamic, Christian and Jewish courts with a uniform, secular
system.).
31. See Seán Patrick Donlan, The Mediterranean Hybridity Project:
Crossing the Boundaries of Law and Culture, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 355 (2011)
(describing “mixed legal systems” as “diverse state laws [that] emerge from
different legal traditions, . . .”) Id. at 359-60, and noting that:
Neither the hybridity nor the diffusion of laws is new. Within Europe,
law predated the state and the creation of genuinely national laws; a
legal “system” centered on the modern nation-state, and the elimination
of competing jurisdictions and marginalization of non-legal norms was
a very long historical process. Especially before the 19th century, there
were multiple contemporaneous legal orders co-existing in the same
geographical space and at the same time. Modern national traditions are
unique hybrids rooted in diverse customary or folklaws, summary and
discretionary jurisdictions, local and particular iura propria, the
Romano-canonical “learned laws” or ius commune, and other transterritorial iura communia (including feudal law and the lex mercatoria).
Id. at 356.
32. See Kamel Charfeggine, supra note 10.
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law, the article demonstrates that this body of law is remarkably
well-suited to the task of accommodating a diverse society, parts of
which might insist on or desire the application of certain Islamic
legal norms. 33 Moreover, it is a historically important document as
it is also an early example of legal fusion—“une tentative de
conciliation unique en son genre entre droits civils de pays
européens et droit civil musulman.” 34
A. Tunisian Legal History: A Brief Overview
Before delving too deeply into Tunisian legislation, it is worth
noting some key aspects of Tunisia’s legal history which have
served to shape and continuously influence the country’s legal
physiognomy. The geographic territory that we associate today
with the modern country of Tunisia 35 is one with a rich history of
diverse people and successive empires, all of which influence
modern Tunisia’s fascinating legal culture. The Punic Wars
brought Tunisia under the Roman Empire in 149 BC. 36 Tunisia’s
subsequent “integration into the Roman and Byzantine Empires led
to the Christianization of the region in the first several centuries
CE.” 37 Arab Muslim armies, however, “conquered Tunisia in the
33. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Death of Islamic Law, 38 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 293, 295 (2009-2010): “That the Muslim world is replete with political
institutions and leaders (described herein, in their multitudinous varieties and
approaches, as ‘Islamist’) who seek a greater role than this for the shari’a in the
affairs of the state is obvious to anyone even faintly familiar with the region.”
34. See Faouzi Belknani, Code des obligations et des contrats et la
codification in LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE DU CODE DES OBLIGATIONS ET DES
CONTRATS 1906-2006 at 17 (Mohamed Kamel Charfeggine ed., 2006).
35. Although this article, for the sake of clarity, consistently refers to
“Tunisia,” it is important to keep in mind Professor Lisa Anderson’s admonition
that “it is an anachronism to refer . . . to “Tunisia” and “Libya” when discussing
the 19th century. Until they were occupied by the Europeans, these countries
were known by the names of their capital cities, Tunis and Tripoli.” LISA
ANDERSON, THE STATE AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN TUNISIA AND LIBYA,
1830-1980 at 13 (1986).
36. See The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs,
Tunisia:
From
the
Roman
Empire
to
Ottoman
Rule,
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/tunisia-from-the-roman-empire-toottoman-rule.
37. Id.

2014]

TUNISIAN CIVIL LAW

11

late seventh century and initiated the spread of Islamic influences
throughout the country.” 38 Coextensive with that series of rulers,
Roman law prevailed in the early history of the territory known
today as Tunisia, until the Arab conquest in the 7th Century AD
effectively replaced Roman law with Islamic law. 39 During that
latter period, among the predominantly Muslim population, the
Maliki school of Islamic law became most prominent during the
Aghlabite dynasty, though a notable minority of adherents to the
Hanafite school also existed in the region. 40 Islamic law, however,
applied only to Muslims during this period. The Jewish population
was still governed by Mosaic law and Christians by ecclesiastic
law (which retained elements of Roman law). 41 Professor Faouzi
Belknani, a legal scholar who has served on faculties in both
Tunisia and Qatar, notes that, in the 12th century, Muslim jurists
compiled collections fatwas and juridical opinions on diverse
questions of law, 42 such as the Hanafite compilations of Alhindia
and Alamkîrya or the Malikite collection called Al-Mi’yâr by the
jurist al-Wanshârisi. 43
The modern administration of Tunisia began in the 19th
Century, 44 which saw the creation of multiple distinct jurisdictions
and courts, the applicability of which depended on the religion of
the party. For instance, Muslims had access to Malikite or Hanifite
courts, while Jews had access to rabbinical courts, etc. 45 As a
general matter, however, commentators note that, before 1885,
civil law in Tunisia was largely regulated by Islamic law. 46 It was
also during the 19th century that efforts to codify Tunisian law
began. The Civil and Penal Code promulgated in 1861 by Sadek
38. Id.
39. See Afif Gaigi, Tunisia in YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE
EASTERN LAW 417 (1994).
40. Id. at 417-18.
41. Id. at 418.
42. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 12.
43. Id.
44. See Id. at 14 n.44.
45. See Afif Gaigi, supra note 39, at 418.
46. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 14.
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Bey contained provisions inspired by Maliki and Hanafi schools of
Islamic law, 47 but was short lived and was repealed by 1864. 48 In
1885, the promulgation of the Tunisian Code foncier marked the
beginning of a process of progressive diminution of Islamic law’s
applicability in Tunisia. 49 The momentum toward codification had
begun and would only garner force.
It is also worth noting that, in 1876, as the global movement
toward codification began, perhaps the most significant early
attempt at codification of Islamic law came with the promulgation
of the Ottoman code known as the Mejelle. 50 That compilation
would, however, have no immediate influence on the development
of Tunisian law and was never fully in force in the region today
associated with modern Tunisia—a region which, as noted, was
deeply immersed in its own legislative initiatives by the time the
Mejelle was promulgated. 51 In that regard, commentators note that
the Ottoman legal reforms of the late 19th century occurred
parallel to Tunisian legal developments, but did not have
significant impacts in Tunisia, which “retained substantial
autonomy under the rule of the Husaynid Bey. . . .” 52 Nonetheless,
as discussed further below, the Mejelle would come to influence
modern Tunisian civil law in later years.
In 1881, with the Treaty of Bardo, Tunisia’s period as a French
protectorate began. During this time, the Bey maintained power in
theory, but was effectively under the power of a foreign (French)
sovereign. 53 French legal influence became more pronounced in
47. See Afif Gaigi, supra note 39, at 418.
48. Id. at 419.
49. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 14.
50. Id. It is interesting to note that the Mejelle, though frequently
characterized as the first codification of Islamic civil law, is predated in Tunisia
by Sadek Bey's Civil and Penal Code of 1861.
51. See Maaike Voorhoeve, Judges in a web of normative orders: judicial
practices at the Court of First Instance Tunis in the field of divorce law 52
(Ph.D. Thesis, University of Amsterdam 2011), available at
http://dare.uva.nl/record/400650.
52. Id.
53. See Afif Gaigi, supra note 39, at 419.
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1883 after signing of the Treaty of Marsa formally established the
French protectorate and permitted France to directly undertake
legislative reforms. 54 This opened the door to far more expansive
and ambitious legal projects, among the first of which was an
effort to codify Tunisia’s civil and commercial law based on the
French model of codification, 55 an effort which, for its successful
completion, required a deep knowledge of continental civil law,
sensitivity to local Tunisian custom, and expertise in Islamic law.
This effort resulted in a remarkable piece of legislation which has
now been in force for well over a century.
B. David Santillana and the Synthesis of Civil Law and Islamic
Law in Tunisia
During Tunisia’s time as a French protectorate, the task of
developing a codification of Tunisian civil law ultimately fell on a
codification commission composed of four French scholars and a
Tunisian jurist named David Santillana. 56 Born in Tunis in 1855,
Santillana came from a Jewish family of European ancestry. 57
Commentators suggest that Santillana’s family fled to Tunisia after
the fall of Grenada and the expulsion of the Jewish population.58
Historical records note that his grandfather, David Diaz Santillana,

54. Id. at 419.
55. See Charfeggine, supra note 10.
56. Santillana is a notable figure in legal history, whose life and
circumstances paralleled, in interesting ways, that of Moreau-Lislet, in that both
were civil law jurists whose presence in the jurisdictions where they were to
have an impact was the result of displacement—making each something of an
outsider, but not without a definite link with and affinity for their adopted
jurisdiction. See LEVASSEUR, supra note 9, at 80.
57. See Nadhir Ben Ammou, L’Avant Propos De L’Avant-Projet De Code
Civil Et Commercial Tunisien in LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE DU CODE DES
OBLIGATIONS ET DES CONTRATS 1906-2006 at 65 (Mohamed Kamel
Charfeggine ed. 2006).
58. Id. See also Jewish History Sourcebook: The Expulsion from Spain,
1492 CE, available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/jewish/1492-jewsspain1.asp: “In the spring of 1492, shortly after the Moors were driven out of
Granada, Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain expelled all the Jews from their lands
and thus, by a stroke of the pen, put an end to the largest and most distinguished
Jewish settlement in Europe.”
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was born in Tunis in 1780 and served as a translator for the British
Consulate General. 59 His father, Moses Santillana, succeeded his
grandfather as consular interpreter 60 and became a close
companion of Richard Wood, the British Consul in Tunisia, who
saw to it that the younger David Santillana was educated in an
Italian school in Tunis. 61 Thereafter, Santillana studied law in
Rome and, after graduation, worked as an attorney both in Rome
and Florence, 62 though still playing a role in controversial legal
matters across North Africa, such as the legal defense of Ahmed
Orabi, an Egyptian military officer who staged a revolt against the
British and French presence in Egypt. 63
Cultivated in such a cosmopolitan and learned environment,
Santillana grew to become a comparative law scholar, a
practitioner, and an expert in Islamic law who understood the
potential for Islamic law’s viability in a modern context.64 As a
result, when the Commission for the Codification of Tunisian
Laws was established in 1896, Santillana was a natural choice to
preside over the commission along with four French legal scholars.
This commission would produce a draft civil code which would
eventually become enacted in part as the Tunisian Code of
Contracts and Obligations. 65 To create this remarkable piece of
legislation, Santillana and his team would draw on a plurality of

59. See Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Reports from
Commissioners, Naturalization Commission, Appendix to the Report, at 9
(1869).
60. Id.
61. See Ammou, supra note 57.
62. Id.
63. ALEXANDER MEYRICK BROADLEY, HOW WE DEFENDED ARÁBI AND HIS
FRIENDS: A STORY OF EGYPT AND THE EGYPTIANS 75 (1884) (referring to
Santillana as “one of the most accomplished living Arabic scholars”).
64. See Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International Human Rights Law
in Islamic States, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 202, 213-14 (1990) (quoting Santillana as
writing: “There is no doubt that the high ethical standard of certain parts of Arab
law acted favourably on the development of our modern concepts and therein
has its enduring merit.”).
65. See GEORGE N. SFEIR, MODERNIZATION OF THE LAW IN ARAB STATES
39 (1998).
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sources, namely the French civil code, 66 the German civil code,67
several schools of Islamic jurisprudence (especially the Malikite
and Hanafite schools), 68 and the Ottoman codification of Islamic
law known as the Mejelle. 69 Commentators also note that their
work was influenced by Tunisian custom, French jurisprudence,
and the jurisprudence of French courts which were active in
Tunisia during its time as a French protectorate. 70 The character of
the Tunisian code, therefore, is as diverse and cosmopolitan as its
principal author.
The creation of such a code—successfully addressing the needs
of so diverse a polity—was a complex endeavor. An analysis of his
work demonstrates that Santillana synthesized diverse sources of
continental civil law with Islamic law and Tunisian custom
through four primary methods. The first of these was by direct
incorporation of Islamic law and legal devices into the codal text.
The second method was through exploiting the natural parallelisms
that exist between Islamic law and continental civil law. In that
regard, scholars have noted that “Islamic Law is rooted in Arabic
and Middle-Eastern legal traditions, but through its evolution, it
has assimilated elements of Roman law.” 71 The third method used
by Santillana consisted of excepting Muslims from aspects of the
civil law which might violate the tenets of Islamic law and,
thereby, permitting certain transactions between Muslims to occur
in a way that comports with Islamic law. The fourth method used
by Santillana involved imparting a religious dimension to
otherwise secular legal devices, a technique which, in the context
of Tunisia, naturally tilts in favor of Islamic law. The result is a
codification of civil law which, at the same time, adheres to the
66. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 18.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 12.
70. See Voorhoeve, supra note 51, at 54.
71. See Ayman Daher, The Shari'a: Roman Law Wearing an Islamic Veil?,
3 HIRUNDO: THE MCGILL JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL STUDIES 91, 92 (2005).
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modern civil law model inspired by the French civil code and is
also uniquely Tunisian.
III. THE TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
Tunisia’s unique legal history and development resulted in a
somewhat different approach to codification than what is seen
elsewhere in civil law jurisdictions. Rather than a single, cohesive
code governing all civil law—or even the “codal dualism” 72 that
characterizes countries in the Middle East and North Africa with
codes drafted by Abd al-Razzaq Al-Sanhūrī—Tunisian legal
development has been characterized by what has been called
“thematic codification.” 73 For instance, Tunisian property law is
now largely governed by the law of 12/2/1965 which enacted the
Code of Real Rights, 74 the Personal Status Code governs “personal
status law” such as marriage, divorce, and successions, 75 etc. As a
result, among the most notable aspects of the Tunisian Code of
Obligations and Contracts is its intensely subject-specific focus.
Centered, as its name implies, on the formation of obligations and
contracts, the Tunisian Code lacks provisions of broader
applicability to persons and things that characterize most modern
civil codes. In that regard, the Tunisian Code consists of only 1531
total articles which are divided into two books: Book I
(Obligations in General); 76 and Book II (Different Contracts and
Quasi-Contracts Relating Thereto). 77 Commentators have noted
72. For a discussion of “codal dualism,” see Dan E. Stigall, Iraqi Civil Law:
Its Sources, Substance, and Sundering, J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 16, 47 (2006).
73. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 40.
74. See Afif Gaigi, supra note 39, at 426.
75. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 40. Given the diversification of codes in
Tunisia, it must be emphasized that the Tunisian Code of Obligations and
Contracts represents but one facet of the corpus of laws that comprise the
entirety of Tunisian civil law. It is, nonetheless, a critical pillar in the
architecture of the Tunisian legal system.
76. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Book I (Arts. 1563).
77. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Book II (Arts. 564 –
1531).
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that this division, in essence, divides the Tunisian code into a
“general part” and a “special part,” each of which reflects a
diversity of sources. 78
A. Sources of Law
As noted, the Tunisian Code of Obligations and Contracts is
derived from a plurality of sources, though a study of the manner
in which those sources are referenced or incorporated into the code
reveals a fascinating array of legislative feats and codal
compromises which were necessitated by the political environment
in which the Tunisian code germinated. Interestingly, in contrast to
the relatively meticulous and comprehensive approach which
characterizes the rest of the Tunisian code, the legal provisions
which concern the Tunisian code’s sources of law (those which
may be called upon in interpreting the code’s provisions) tend to
be somewhat recondite. In setting forth the sources of law that may
be drawn upon for the proper interpretation of codal provisions, the
Tunisian code states that, in applying the law, one shall give it no
other meaning than that resulting from the ordinary meaning of the
law’s provisions and the intent of the legislature. 79 The code
specifically states that “[w]hen the law is expressed in general
terms, it must be understood in the same sense.” 80 Likewise, where
the law reserves a particular case, it applies to all other cases which
are not expressly excepted. Where a case cannot be decided by a
specific provision of the law, a court may look to the provisions
governing similar cases. 81 If the solution is still in doubt, the
Tunisian code states that a court may decide according to “general
rules of law,” 82 a phrase which is conspicuously inexact and
nebulous.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See Belknani, supra note 34, at 14.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 532.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 533.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 535.
Id.
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Both the phraseology and the location of these articles of the
Tunisian code are in striking discord with the articles addressing
sources of law in most other civil codes, including civil codes in
the Middle East and North Africa. In comparable codes, the
sources of law are generally set forth in Article 1 of the civil
code—an initial article which typically articulates a predictable
hierarchy of sources. 83 For example, the Libyan Civil Code, Syrian
Civil Code, Egyptian Civil Code, and Algerian Civil Code all
contain an initial article (Article 1) which governs the sources of
law and, in essence, states that the written provisions of the code
govern all matters. In the absence of written provisions, Article 1
of those codes uniformly states that courts may adjudicate matters
in accordance with the principles of Islamic law. 84 In the absence
of an Islamic rule on a particular matter, the Libyan, Syrian,
Egyptian, and Algerian codes permit courts to look to custom and
the principles of equity. 85
But the Tunisian code is different and does not reference
Islamic law as a subsidiary source of law, nor any other specific
body of law. In that regard, Tunisian courts have held that nothing
in the Tunisian code permits recourse to Islamic law as a source of
law, 86 and commentators have noted that the very ambiguous
reference in Article 535 to the “general rules of law” offers little
clarity with regard to other potential sources of law and may have
been a purposive ambiguity deemed necessary in this early
codification of Tunisian law. 87 Otherwise stated, it has been

83. See, e.g., LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE (LA CIV. CODE) art. 1: “The sources of
law are legislation and custom;” LA CIV. CODE art. 4: “When no rule for a
particular situation can be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound
to proceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice,
reason, and prevailing usages.”
84. See LIBYAN CIVIL CODE, Art. 1, para. 2.; SYRIAN CIVIL CODE, Art. 1.
85. Id.
86. See STÉPHANE PAPI, L’INFLUENCE JURIDIQUE ISLAMIQUE AU MAGHREB
235 n.1273 (2009).
87. See M. Mohamed Kamel Charfeddine, Esquisse sur la méthode
normative retenue dans l'élaboration du Code tunisien des obligations et
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suggested that this is a simple prudence, designed to allow the code
to take root and become integrated into Tunisian society. 88
Interestingly, Professor Haider Ala Hamoudi, in his excellent
work on post-conflict constitution drafting in Iraq, posits that when
formulating national legislation such as a constitution in a postconflict environment where key stake-holders may have
pronounced “identitarian commitments,” it is sometimes
advantageous for drafters to permit such legislative lacunae to exist
so that long-term solutions can be incrementally achieved. 89
[T]he solution well may be to proceed with constitution
making, but on particularly difficult problems—namely
those in which any view to the long term is likely to raise
the prospect of intractable disputes based on quite
inconsistent conceptions of statehood—to defer the
problem for later, incremental resolution. In other words,
on such matters of dispute, the solution might well be,
counterintuitively, to push the problem off in a manner that
will reduce the stakes. 90
Santillana seems to have taken just such an approach with the
Tunisian code insofar as it remains ambiguous as to which sources
of law may be invoked by Tunisian courts. There are, however,
other ways that a legal source can find influence in a civil code
beyond express references. Even where a code does not expressly
permit recourse to a certain body of law—such as Islamic law—
elements from a legal tradition may still find relevance by being

des contrats, 48 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ. 421, 440
(1996):
Ambiguïté voulue ou ambiguïté dictée par la crainte d'une mise en
cause par les juges de l'œuvre d'unification législative du droit des
obligations réalisée pour la première fois en Tunisie? A moins qu'il ne
s'agisse que d'une simple prudence pour enraciner le nouveau code et
permettre son intégration en imposant le respect strict de ses
dispositions.
88. Id.
89. See HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI, NEGOTIATING IN CIVIL CONFLICT:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND IMPERFECT BARGAINING IN IRAQ 224
(2013).
90. Id.
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incorporated into the codal text or through more subtle
mechanisms which permit those sources to exude influence. This is
certainly true for Santillana’s work in the Tunisian code which
sought to incorporate Islamic legal principles and to blend those
legal rules with European legal norms, effectively fusing two
normative orders. 91
B. Formation of Obligations and Contracts
Belknani notes that the general provisions relating to
obligations in the Tunisian code are essentially drawn from the
continental civil law tradition. 92 Continental civil law, in that
regard, envisions an obligation as something more expansive than
simply a contract (though a contract can certainly form an
obligation). Deriving the concept of an obligation from Roman
law, civil law theorists have maintained that an obligation is “a
legal relationship that compels us to give, to do, or to not do
something.” 93 This allows for obligations that are bilateral (such as
contracts) but also for unilateral obligations by which only a single
party is bound. 94
In Roman law, according to a text by Gaius, all obligations
derive from contract, delict, and several other causes. On
that basis, the Corpus Juris asserts the existence of four
sources of obligations which, as universally accepted by
doctrine with almost no exception, are contracts, quasicontracts, delicts, and quasi-delicts. 95

91. See Voorhoeve, supra note 51, at 54: “Santillana explicitly referred to
the Ottoman Mecelle and Qadri Pasha’s works as sources of inspiration, as well
as Sahnun’s Mudawwana and Khalil’s Mukhtasar. When choosing between
different solutions from Islamic law, the principle that was closest to French law
was chosen.”
92. See Belknani, supra note 34, at 21.
93. A.M. DEMANTE, 3 PROGRAMME DU COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS
246 (1833).
94. DEMANTE, supra note 93, at 248.
95. SAÚL LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS, §1.6, at 10 (2001).
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The Tunisian code’s first article states that obligations are
derived from conventions and other declarations of will, quasicontracts, delicts, and quasi-delicts. 96 Similarly, under Tunisian
law, the elements necessary for a valid obligation are: (1) the
capacity to form an obligation; (2) a valid declaration concerning
the essential elements of the obligation; (3) a definite object that
can be the object of an obligation; and (4) a lawful cause for the
obligation 97—requirements which echo civil law based on the
French model and which adopt the continental civil law
paradigm. 98 It must be noted, however, that these rules are also
consistent with Islamic law which requires people entering into
contracts to be of sound mind, 99 a lawful object for contracts, 100
and which requires contracts to have a lawful cause. 101
Under Tunisian law, all persons have the capacity to form
obligations unless declared otherwise by the law 102 and, notably,
the Tunisian Code expressly states that religious differences
between muslims and non-muslims has no bearing on the capacity
to contract, nor do such religious differences impact obligations
between muslims and non-muslims. 103 Importantly, however, the
Tunisian code—as explained more fully below—contains a host of

96. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1. This article
is almost identical in substance to Article 1757 of the Louisiana Civil Code
which states that “[o]bligations arise from contracts and other declarations of
will. They also arise directly from the law, regardless of a declaration of will, in
instances such as wrongful acts, the management of the affairs of another, unjust
enrichment and other acts or facts. LA CIV. CODE art. 1757
97. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 2.
98. DEMANTE, supra note 93, at 252: “Ces conditions sont au nombre de
quatre: le consentement, la capacité, l’objet et la cause.”
99. MEJELLE, Art. 957 (“Infants, madmen and people of unsound mind
(Ma’tuh) are of themselves prohibited from dealing with their property”), and
Art. 966 (“When an infant has not understanding for business (Art. 943) even if
his guardian give him permission, his verbal dispositions of property are
fundamentally invalid.”).
100. MEJELLE, Art. 197 (“The existence of the thing sold is necessary”) and
Art. 199 (“It is necessary that the thing sold should be [permitted by law].”).
101. MEJELLE, Art. 211.
102. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 3.
103. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 4.
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provisions that provide for exceptions in the case of contracts
between muslims.
1. Unilateral Acts
Civil law doctrine recognizes, to varying degrees, the concept
of a unilateral act. 104 Planiol attributed the more modern approach
of permitting a unilateral declaration to form a binding obligation
to German jurists. 105 While a relatively recent innovation during
Planiol’s era, unilateral acts are now well-founded in modern civil
law doctrine. As Litvinoff noted, “under certain circumstances, the
law may attach consequences to a merely unilateral declaration of
will which is promissory in nature.” 106 Under Tunisian law, while
a mere promise does not operate to create an obligation, 107 a
promise made by posters or other means of advertising which offer
a reward to one who finds a lost object or accomplishes a task can
create an obligation, and is deemed to be accepted by those who,
even without having knowledge of the offer, find the thing or
accomplish the task. 108 In such circumstances, the author of the
promise is required to provide the promised reward. 109
Interestingly, while these provisions comport with the civil law
model, they are drawn more from the German model than the
French Code Civil and mirror quite closely the 1984 amendments
to the Louisiana Civil Code, which “adopted the German-oriented

104. The degree to which unilateral declarations are considered sources of
obligations varies among modern civil codes. See, e.g., Pablo Lerner, Promises
of Rewards in a Comparative Perspective, 10 ANNUAL SURVEY OF
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 53, 57 (2004):
If Puffendorf definitively installed the pactum as the central idea, it was
Domat who simplified the problem by putting forth the agreement as
the only expression of the autonomy of will. His ideas were adopted by
the French legislator, and so the French code does not recognize the
unilateral will as a source of obligation.
105. 2 PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 273 (9th ed., 1923).
106. LITVINOFF, supra note 95, at 13-14.
107. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 18.
108. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 19.
109. Id.
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solution, reserving the promise of reward only for the case of
performance of a specific fact.” 110
Tunisian law further states that the promise of reward may not
be revoked where the revocation occurs after execution has
begun. 111 One who has set a deadline for the completion of the task
envisioned by the promise is deemed to have waived the right to
revoke the promise until the expiration of the time limit.112 If
several people have accomplished the task at the same time, the
promised prize or reward is shared between them. 113 If they have
done it at various times, the award belongs to the first to
accomplish it. If they each accomplished a portion of the task, then
the reward is shared proportionally. 114 If the reward cannot be
shared but can be sold, then the price will be shared among the
beneficiaries. 115 If this price or reward is an object that has no
market value or can only be given to one person, then according to
the terms of the promise, the decision is made by drawing lots (“la
décision est remise à la voie du sort”). 116 This latter provision is
also taken directly from the German civil code, 117 thus
demonstrating Santillana’s reliance on a plurality of European civil
law sources when drafting the Tunisian code.
2. Contracts (Bilateral Acts)
The notion of a bilateral act, of course, dates back to ancient
times and was well-developed in Roman law. 118 Modernity and
110. Lerner, supra note 104, at 63.
111. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 20.
112. Id.
113. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 21.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See BGB, Art. 659(2):
If the act has been undertaken simultaneously by more than one person,
then each is entitled to an equal portion of the reward. Where the
reward cannot be shared due to its quality, or if, according to the terms
of the promise of a reward, only one person is to be given the reward,
then the matter is decided by drawing lots.
118. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 333.
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commerce only increased the frequency of this method for forming
obligations. Writing in the 19th century, civil law jurist A.M.
Demante noted that, even during that era, the majority of
obligations were formed through the creation of contracts. 119 The
general rule in modern civil law is that a contract is formed by the
consent of the parties to the contract. 120 Consistent with this
theory, under Tunisian law, a contract is perfected only by
agreement of the parties on the essential elements of the obligation,
as well as on all other lawful clauses that the parties consider
essential to the agreement. 121 Barring a provision to the contrary,
changes by the parties by mutual agreement to the contract which
occur immediately after its conclusion do not constitute a new
contract, but are considered part of the initial agreement. 122 Even
so, a contract is not perfected when the parties expressly reserve
certain clauses to form the object of a subsequent agreement. 123
The agreement reached under these conditions, on one or more
such clauses, does not constitute the conclusion of a contract, even
if a preliminary agreement has been drawn up in writing. 124 In any
case, reservations or restrictions which are not brought to the
attention of the other party are not set aside or restrict the effects of
the declaration of intent as provided for in its apparent
expression. 125
C. Transfer of Obligations
Consistent with the continental civil law tradition, the Tunisian
civil code permits the transfer of obligations. As Litvinoff noted,
“[a]s an asset in his patrimony, the creditor or obligee may transfer
or assign the obligation to another if he so wishes. Also, the debtor
119. A.M. DEMANTE, 2 PROGRAMME DU COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS
246 (1831).
120. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 333.
121. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 23.
122. Id.
123. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 24.
124. Id.
125. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 25.
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may substitute another person at his end of the relation. In both
instances the obligation remains the same, however.” 126 Under
Tunisian law, the transfer of rights and claims of an original
creditor to another person can take place, either pursuant to the
provisions of Tunisian law or pursuant to an agreement between
the parties. 127 Rights or claims that are not yet expired may be
transferred, 128 though such a transfer may not operate for future
rights. 129 Similarly, the transfer is considered null: where the right
or claim may not be transferred by virtue of its constitutive title or
by law; where it is intended that the rights or claims are of a purely
personal nature; or where the debt cannot be subject to seizure or
attachment—though when the right or claim is susceptible of being
seized with the concurrence of a party or to have its value
determined, the assignment of the right will be valued in the same
proportion. 130 The assignment of a claim includes the accessories
that are integral to the claim, such as privileges, with the exception
of those that are personal to the assignor. 131 It includes wages,
mortgages and sureties unless there is an express stipulation to the
contrary. 132
Notably, an assignment is also assumed to include accrued
interest unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. This latter
provision relating to interest, however, is not applicable between
Muslims.133 This exception pertaining to Muslims, of course, is
due to the provisions of Islamic law which disallow the charging of
interest in the course of transactions. 134 The authority for this
doctrine in Islamic law—which is not interpreted with precise
126. LITVINOFF, supra note 95.
127. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 199.
128. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 200.
129. Id.
130. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 201.
131. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 210.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. ABDUR RAHIM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE
ACCORDING TO THE HANAFI, MALIKI, SHAFII AND HANBALI SCHOOLS 294-95
(1911).
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uniformity135—is from Quranic exhortations against the idea of
ribā (or interest) 136 and sunna in which the Prophet is reported to
have said as follows:
(Sell) gold for gold and silver for silver, wheat for wheat,
barley for barley, dates for dates and salt for salt of the
same kind for the same kind and the same quantity for the
same quantity, from hand to hand and if they differ from
each other in quantity sell them as you like but from hand
to hand. 137
In permitting an exception to ordinary civil law for Muslims
where interest is involved, Santillana adopts a civil law concept but
in a way which permits compatibility with Islamic legal tenets.
D. Extinction of Obligations
The Tunisian code’s articles on the extinction of obligations
are drawn from civil law in that they incorporate civil law concepts
of remission of debt, novation, compensation, and confusion.
Notably, however, these articles also incorporate Islamic legal
concepts that provide traditional protections and limit the civil law
concepts to the extent their operability could transgress Islamic
legal boundaries.

135. RAHIM, supra note 134, at 294:
The Hanafi doctors have interpreted the tradition to mean that
whenever an article belonging to the description of similar of capacity
or of weight is sold or exchanged for an article of the same species,
neither party is allowed to receive anything in excess of the quantity
sold by himself , in other words absolute equality in quantity is insisted
upon. The Shafi’is hold that the law of riba only applies to articles of
food and such things as constitute price, namely gold and silver.
136. YASIN DUTTON, THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC LAW: THE QUR’AN, THE
MUWATTA, AND MADINAN ‘AMAL 149 (2002):
Ribā, like zakat, was another situation where the general judgment in
the Qur’an as clear but the precise details problematic. The main
prohibition against ribā comes in Q 2: 278-9 where we read that those
who practice ribā should be aware that they have engaged in “a war
with Allah and His Messenger,” from which the “ulamā” derived the
judgement that those who engage in ribā and refuse to repent are, if
they have a power-base [are to be fought as rebels].
137. RAHIM, supra note 134, at 294.
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1. Remission of Debt
A remission of debt, according to civil law doctrine, is a
unilateral act by which a creditor renounces his or her rights
against a debtor. 138 Such an act produces a liberation of the debtor,
extinguishing the debt and all accessory obligations pertaining to
the debt. 139 Tunisian law incorporates this concept, though alloyed
with Islamic legal concepts. Under Tunisian law, an obligation is
extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the obligation by a
creditor that is considered capable of making a donation. 140 The
remission takes effect as long as it has not been expressly refused
by the debtor. 141 Tunisian law also notes, however, that the
remission granted by an ill person to a third party during his or her
last illness is valid up to a maximum of one-third of what remains
in the succession after the payment of debts and funeral
expenses. 142 This latter provision is derived from Islamic law
which generally places a limit of one third of the estate on the
amount which a person may bequest (preserving the remainder of
the decedent’s estate for family members) 143 and, therefore,
placing cautionary limits on the ability of an ill person to alienate
property and extinguish debts in excess of that limit. For instance,
the Mejelle provides as follows:
If someone in his mortal sickness has given something to
one of his heirs and has died, if the other heirs do not allow
it, that gift is not good.
But if he has made a gift and delivered it to a person who is
not an heir of his, and a third of his estate is sufficient for
138. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 198.
139. Id.
140. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 350.
141. Id.
142. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 355.
143. See, e.g., UN-Habitat, Islam, Land & Property Research Series, Paper
6: Islamic Inheritance Laws and Systems, at 10 (2005), available at
ww2.unhabitat.org/programmes/landtenure/documents/ILP%206.doc:
“[A]
Muslim’s ability to bequeath is restricted to only one-third of an individual's
estate under certain rules with the remaining two-thirds devolving according to
the compulsory inheritance rules.”
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the whole of the gift, it is good.
If it is not sufficient, and the heirs do not permit the gift,
the gift is good up to the amount, for which the third of the
estate is sufficient. The rest, the donee is compelled to
return. 144
The Tunisian code, therefore, incorporates the Islamic legal
limitation of “one third of the estate” into the civil law concept of
remission of debt and protections designed to maintain the
integrity of Islamic inheritance law. Otherwise, the Tunisian codal
language is largely consistent with other modern civil codes,
holding that the release of any debt in general and without
reservation cannot be revoked. 145 Special provisions, however,
exempt the finality of such remissions made by an heir in the case
of an inherited debt and where that remission was justified by
fraud or deceit on the part of the debtor or other people acting in
complicity with the debtor. 146 It is worth noting here, however, that
many continental civil law jurisdictions, likewise, maintain the
concept of “forced heirship” (deriving their rules in that regard
from Roman law) and similarly prohibit bequests in excess of a
certain portion of the decedent’s estate. 147 The Tunisian, Islamic,
Roman, and continental civil law rules tend to blur into one
another at such legal intersections.
2. Novation
The concept of novation is drawn from Roman law but was
adapted by civil law jurists throughout the ages so that it is
applicable to modern contracts and obligations. 148 Under Tunisian
law, novation is the extinction of an obligation due to the creation
144. MEJELLE, Art. 879.
145. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 356.
146. Id.
147. Joseph Dainow, The Early Sources of Forced Heirship: Its History in
Texas and Louisiana, 4 LA. L. REV. 60 (1941) (Noting that in Louisiana “as in
both French and Spanish law, excessive dispositions are not null, but are
reducible to the disposable quantum.”).
148. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 178: “La novation est un procédé d’origine
romaine mais qui s’est bien transformé depuis l’antiquité.”
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of a new obligation which is substituted for it. 149 Novation cannot
be presumed and, to the contrary, the desire for a novation must be
expressed. 150 Both the former obligation and the newly formed
obligation must be considered legally valid obligations for
novation to have effect. 151
The Tunisian Code provides that novation occurs in three types
of circumstances: (1) when the creditor and debtor agree to
substitute a new obligation for the former, which extinguishes or
changes the cause of the former obligation; (2) when a new debtor
is substituted for the former who is discharged by the creditor
(such a substitution may take place without the participation of the
first debtor); and/or (3) where, by the effect of a new commitment,
a new creditor is substituted for the former creditor, thus
discharging the debtor vis-à-vis the former creditor. 152 Such a
definition comports with the concept of novation as it appears in
modern civil codes based on the French model. 153
3. Compensation
Civil law doctrine maintains that when two people owe to one
another similar obligations, it is not necessary that each one pay
the other. Rather, it is simpler to consider each obligation
reciprocally extinguished up to the amount of the lesser debt. 154
Litvinoff notes that, in civil law systems based on the French
model, “[c]ompensation takes place by operation of law, that is,
independently of the will of the parties. The two obligations
extinguish each other reciprocally, to the extent of the lesser

149. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 357.
150. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 358.
151. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 359.
152. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 361.
153. See, e.g., LA CIV. CODE art. 1881: “Novation takes place when, by
agreement of the parties, a new performance is substituted for that previously
owed, or a new cause is substituted for that of the original obligation. If any
substantial part of the original performance is still owed, there is no novation.”
154. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 189; LA CIV. CODE art. 1893.
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object, as soon as they co-exist.” 155 In systems based on the
German model, in contrast, “compensation does not take place
automatically, but must be raised as a defense by the interested
party. . . .” 156
Tunisian law also recognizes this civil law concept, though
with a typically Tunisian variant on the theme. According to the
Tunisian Code, “[c]ompensation occurs when parties are mutually
and personally creditor and debtor of the other. It does not take
place between Muslims in cases where it would constitute a
violation of religious law.” 157 Santillana, therefore, again adopts a
civil law concept but permits an exception to it for Muslims insofar
as it might run afoul of the tenets of Islamic law. Otherwise,
Tunisian law permits that compensation may take place between
debts which have different causes or are of different portions.158
When the two debts are not of the same sum, compensation is
carried out up to a maximum of the lesser debt. 159 Consistent with
civil law doctrine, Tunisian law provides that compensation takes
place between debts of same kind and quality. 160 Tunisian law
requires that the two debts must be liquidated and presently due,
but it is not necessary that they be payable at the same place. 161
4. Confusion
Planiol defines the civil law concept of confusion as the union
of the two qualities of creditor and debtor in the same person (“la
reunion sur la même tête des deux qualités de créancier et de
débiteur”) and notes that this concept most frequently finds
application by the effect of a succession in which a creditor

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

LITVINOFF, supra note 95.
Id.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 369.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 377.
Id.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 373.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 374.
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inherits a debt. 162 Under Tunisian law, when the qualities of
creditor and debtor of an obligation is together in the same person,
there is a confusion of rights which eliminates the relationship
between creditor and debtor. 163 Consistent with civil law doctrine,
the Tunisian code provides that confusion may be total or partial,
depending on whether it occurs for the entire obligation or only a
portion. 164 When the cause that produces confusion disappears, the
credit-right is revived along with its accessories, for all persons,
and confusion is deemed to have never occurred. 165 The Tunisian
articles on confusion are scant, but maintain the civil law concept
without modification.
E. Vices of Consent
Continental civil law has traditionally held that “le dol, l’erreur
et la violence sont les trois causes qui vicient la volonté.” 166 As
civil law jurist Saul Litvinoff noted when explaining this concept:
Autonomy of the will is the basic idea that underlies the
doctrine of juridical acts implicit in the civil codes of
France and Louisiana. From the vantage point of that idea,
a person’s declaration of will produces the intended legal
effects when the consent it expresses is informed by a
reason, a cause, and is also free from interfering
circumstances that frustrate its intention. As clearly stated
in the Code Napoleon, consent is invalid when it has been
given through error, extorted by duress, or obtained by
fraud. When such is the case, though consent has come into
existence, it is impaired, defective, it is tainted by a vice
that affects its freedom. 167

162. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 197.
163. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 382.
164. Id.
165. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 383.
166. PLANIOL, supra at 105, at 165.
167. See Saul Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress, and an
Epilogue on Lesion, 50 LA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989).
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Islamic law, likewise, has long held that fraud, 168 error, 169 and
duress 170 are grounds for rescinding contracts. These legal
provisions, therefore, form an area of comparative overlap between
Islamic law and continental civil law.
The Tunisian Code incorporates this framework for vitiation of
consent—though clearly drawing its provisions principally from
the French model. Accordingly, under Tunisian law, the consent of
a party is annullable when it is given in error, when induced by
fraud, and when it is obtained through violence. 171
1. Error
Error, under the Tunisian code, can give rise to rescission when
it is a legal error or a factual error. 172 With regard to legal error,
such an error may result in rescission when (1) it is the sole or
principal cause for the obligation; and (2) if it is excusable. 173 A
factual error, likewise, may give rise to rescission when it bears on
the identity, type, or quality of the object of the obligation.174
Simple errors in calculation, however, do not give rise to
rescission, but they must be rectified. 175
2. Violence
The vice of consent termed “violence” in the Tunisian code is
defined as “coercion without the authority of the law, and subject
to which one brings a person to perform an act to which he or she
did not consent.” 176 Violence, under Tunisian law, gives rise to
168.
52.
169.
32.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See RAHIM, supra note 134, at 237; see also MEJELLE, Art. 20 and Art.
See RAHIM, supra note 134, at 237; see also MEJELLE, Art. 29 and Art.
See RAHIM, supra note 134, at 232-237; see also MEJELLE, Art. 52.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 43.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 44 and 45.
Id.
Id.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 47.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 50.
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rescission when that violence was the principal cause for
undertaking the obligation and when—having regard to age,
gender, status of the person and their level of impressionability—
the violence consists of acts that are of such a nature that they are
likely to produce physical suffering, or profound mental suffering
(from fear, exposing that person’s honor or possessions to material
injury). 177
The fear inspired by the threat of prosecution or other legal
channels generally will not give rise to rescission under Tunisian
law unless the person making the threat does so in a way that
qualifies as legally cognizable violence (the sorts of willovertaking threats described above) and is done so in a way that
abuses the position of the threatened party by seeking to extort
excessive or undue benefits from him or her. 178
Violence gives rise to rescission of the obligation, even if it
was not exercised by one of the parties to the obligation 179 and
even if it was exercised upon a person with which the contracting
party is closely related by blood. 180 Reverential fear, however,
does not give rise to rescission of an obligation unless also
accompanied by serious threats or assault. 181
3. Fraud
Fraud gives rise to rescission when the tactics or nondisclosures of one of the parties, or a person who represents or is
complicit with that party, are of such a nature that without these
tactics or non-disclosures, the other party would not have
contracted. 182 The deceit practiced by a third party has the same
effect, when the party that benefits from that fraud had knowledge

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 51.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 52.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 53.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 54.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 55.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 56.
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of it. 183 Fraud with regard to the accessories of the obligation and
which was not central to the obligation can give rise only to
damages and not rescission. 184
4. Additional Bases for Rescission
There is reason to rescind when the party who contracted was
in a state of drunkenness, which has troubled his faculties. 185 The
reasons for rescission based on the State of disease and other
similar cases, are subject to the discretion of the judges. 186
Under Tunisian law, lesion does not give rise to rescission,
unless it is caused by fraud by the other party, the other party’s
representative, or by one who acted for the other party. 187 The only
exception to this is when the injured party is a minor or is
incompetent, even though he or she would have contracted with
the assistance of his guardian or legal counsel in the manner
determined by law and although there be no fraud by the other
party. 188 Lesion is defined as any obligation entailing a price
differential beyond a third of the given price and the actual value
of the thing. 189
F. Contract of Sale
A review of the Tunisian provisions relating to the contract of
sale reveal an equally interesting blending of continental civil law
with Islamic legal precepts, both by incorporating requirements
that adhere to the Islamic law of sales and by creating strategic
exceptions where Islamic law and continental civil law diverge.
At the outset, the Tunisian code obviously incorporates
classical civil law concepts into its provisions on the contract of
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 57.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 58.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 59.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 60.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 61.
Id.
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sale. In the continental civil law system, “a sale is a contract by
which a person, who is called the vendor, obliges himself to
transfer the ownership of a thing to another, whereas the other
person, who is the buyer, obliges himself to pay the value of the
thing in money.” 190 The necessary elements of such a sale are the
consent of the parties, a thing to be sold, and a price to be paid. 191
Modern civil codes around the globe maintain this basic concept of
the contract of sale. For instance, under the Louisiana Civil Code, a
“[s]ale is a contract whereby a person transfers ownership of a
thing to another for a price in money. The thing, the price, and the
consent of the parties are requirements for the perfection of a
sale.” 192
The Tunisian code incorporates this very model for the contract
of sale. Under Tunisian law, a sale is a contract by which one party
transfers ownership of a thing or a right to another contracting
party for a price which the latter obligates himself or herself to
pay. 193 A contract of sale is perfected between the parties, as soon
as there is consent of the contracting parties (one to sell and the
other to buy) and the parties agree on the thing, the price and the
other terms of the contract. 194 The Tunisian code, moreover,
requires that the selling price in a contract of sale must be
determined. A contract of sale cannot refer the determination of the
selling price to a third party or the price paid by a third party,
unless the price is known to the contracting parties. 195 The contract
may, however, refer to the fixed market price, or a determined rate,
or the average of the market prices, when it comes to goods which
do not have a variable price. 196 When the price is variable,
contracting parties are presumed to be referring to the average
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 462.
Id. at 464.
LA CIV. CODE art. 2439.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 564.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 580.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 579.
Id.
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market price. 197 These requirements are consonant with classical
continental civil law insofar as the price must be fixed, but seem to
gravitate more toward Islamic law in the rigidity of this
requirement. As Planiol notes, continental civil law has long
permitted the price in a contract of sale to be determined by outside
experts or arbiters, 198 and modern civil codes based on the French
model have permitted even more laxity with regard to prices set by
third parties and even courts. 199 Islamic law, in contrast, has more
adamantly required that the price be determined at the time of the
formation of the contract. 200 This is due to the prohibition on
gharar (the sale of “items whose existence or characteristics is not
certain, the risky nature of which makes the transaction akin to
gambling”). 201 Commentators note that a sale in which the price is
deferred is an example of gharar. 202 The Tunisian code, by
expressly disallowing the selling price to be determined by third
persons, thus, aligns more consistently with Islamic law than
continental civil law.
Islamic law’s influence on Tunisian law becomes even more
pronounced in its articles which hold that a sale is considered null
if it is for things that, by nature or circumstances, are unlikely to be
delivered to the purchaser; for example: the fish in the water, the
197. Id.
198. PLANIOL, supra note 105, at 468, (1923): “La fixation du prix est parfois
chose difficile, et les parties conviennent de s’en rapporter pour son chiffre à
l’appréciation d’un ou de plusiers arbitres ou experts. Ce procédé est licite. . . .”
199. See, e.g., LA CIV. CODE art. 2645: “The price may be left to the
determination of a third person. If the parties fail to agree on or to appoint such a
person, or if the one appointed is unable or unwilling to make a determination,
the price may be determined by the court.”
200. MEJELLE, Art. 237:“It is necessary that the price should be named at the
time of the sale (Bey`). Therefore, if the price of the thing sold is not mentioned
at the time of the sale, the sale is bad (Fasid).” See also MEJELLE, Art. 238: “It is
necessary that the price should be known.”
201. MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PRACTICE 58 (2006).
202. Abdul-Rahim Al-Saati, The Permissible Gharar (Risk) in Classical
Islamic Jurisprudence, 16 J.KAU: ISLAMIC ECON. 3, 8, available at
http://balmeena.kau.edu.sa/Files/320/Researches/50833_20970.pdf (noting that
“[d]eferment of the price to an unknown future date” is an example of a gharar
sale).
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bird in the air, the escaped animal. 203 This prohibition also relates
directly to the prohibition on gharar sales. Commentators have
noted that Islamic law, to varying degrees, has disallowed the sale
of fish in the water and escaped things. 204 “Other hadiths, still of
contemporary relevance, forbid the sale of a bird in the air, a fish
in the water, an escaped animal or slave, or anything else that the
vendor might be unable to deliver owing to lack of possession.”205
Perhaps even more strikingly, any contract of sale is, likewise,
considered null if it is between Muslims and for things declared
unclean by religious law (la loi religieuse) except the objects
which “religious law” has authorized for trade, such as animal
fertilizer for agricultural purposes. 206 Thus, Tunisian civil law
expressly incorporates Islamic law into its law regulating contracts
and prohibits contracts which would violate its precepts.
Under Tunisian law, the buyer acquires full ownership of the
thing sold, as soon as the contract is perfected by the consent of the
parties. 207 As soon as the contract of sale is perfected, the buyer
may dispose of the thing sold, even before delivery. 208 Likewise,
the seller may assign his or her right to payment, even before the
delivery of the thing, unless there is a contrary agreement by the
parties. 209 Such provisions align with continental civil law which
does not require delivery of the thing in order to have transfer of
ownership in a contract of sale. 210 Interestingly, however, the
Tunisian code provides that these latter provisions relating to
transfer of ownership prior to delivery are inapplicable with regard
to the sale of foodstuffs among Muslims. 211 As noted above,
203. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 571.
204. ABDULLAH ALWI HAJI HASSAN, SALES AND CONTRACTS IN EARLY
ISLAMIC COMMERCIAL LAW 80 (2007).
205. DAVID EISENBERG, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 2.69 (2012).
206. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 575.
207. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 583.
208. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 584.
209. Id.
210. DEMANTE, supra note 93, at 141 (“La délivrance ou tradition n’est plus
aujourd’hui requise pour transférer la propriété[.]”
211. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 584.
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Islamic law in regard to such contracts has very specific
requirements with regard to riba212 and, in this instance, the
Tunisian code seems to partially codify the sunna admonishing
believers to
[sell] gold for gold and silver for silver, wheat for wheat,
barley for barley, dates for dates and salt for salt of the
same kind for the same kind and the same quantity for the
same quantity, from hand to hand and if they differ from
each other in quantity sell them as you like but from hand
to hand. 213
Moreover, Islamic law, as reflected in the Mejelle, is more
limiting with regard to what one may do before delivery of the
thing. The Mejelle permits a seller to “dispose of the price of a
thing sold before he has received it,” 214 and, in the case of
immoveable property that “the purchaser can sell to another, before
delivery, the property sold. . . .”215 Moveable property, however,
cannot generally be sold to another before delivery. 216 The
Mejelle, likewise, gives special significance to delivery in sales
involving things sold in quantities that are weighed and do not
suffer damage by division (such as corn) in that such a sale
becomes final when there is delivery and the amount delivered is
correct. 217 Otherwise, the buyer is given a right of option and may
annul the sale or purchase the lesser amount. 218 Under the

212. ABU-MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH BIN ABI-ZAYD & ABDUR-RAHMAN ALQYRAWANI, THE GIST OF THE TREATISE ON MALIKITE JURISPRUDENCE 84
(1994):
When grains, legumes, and preserved foodstuffs are bartered in kind,
the quantity received should be equal to the quantity given; no delay in
delivery is allowed in this exchange. It is forbidden to barter foodstuff
delivered immediately for foodstuff to be delivered at a subsequent
time, whether the exchange is in kind or not, whether the foodstuff is
perishable or not.
213. RAHIM, supra note 134, at 294.
214. MEJELLE, Art. 252.
215. MEJELLE, Art. 253.
216. Id.
217. MEJELLE, Art. 223.
218. Id.
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Mejelle’s provisions, if there is excess in such a case, the surplus
belongs to the seller. 219
Belknani similarly highlights article 565 of the Tunisian code,
relating to the sale of a thing by an ill person on his or her
deathbed. 220 According to that article, the sale by an ill person on
his or her deathbed (“during his last illness”), where it is made to
one of his heirs with the intention to favor that heir (for example,
the thing is sold at a price much lower than the real value of the
thing) is governed by the provisions of article 354 of the Tunisian
code, 221 which, in turn, states that a remission of debt made by an
ill person on his or her deathbed to one of his heirs is valid only if
the other heirs ratify the act. 222 In contrast, the sale by an ill person
to a non-heir is governed by the provisions of article 355 of the
Tunisian code 223 which states that a remission of debt granted by
an ill person to a third party is valid up to a maximum of one-third
of what remains in the estate after the payment of debts and funeral
expenses. 224 Accordingly, under Tunisian law, such a sale could be
limited depending on what debts and expenses remain after the
death of the seller. Belknani notes that such a sale would be
considered mawküf under Islamic law, 225 and a review of Islamic
jurisprudence finds this provision of the Tunisian code to be
derived from the Mejelle:
If a sick person sells something to one of his heirs while he
is in his death sickness, it is dependent on the permission of
the other heirs, if, after the death of the sick person, they
give permission, it takes effect, if they do not give
permission, it does not take effect. 226

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.
See Belknani, supra note 34, at 22 n.99.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 565.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 354.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 565.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 355.
See Belknani, supra note 34, at 23.
MEJELLE, Art. 393.
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Similarly, the Mejelle provides that if a sick person while in his
death sickness sells something, for a price less than the value of the
thing and a third of his property “is not sufficient to provide for the
benefit, the purchaser is compelled to make good the reduction in
the price, and if he [does not] make [the reduction], the heirs can
annul the sale.” 227
In addition, Belknani highlights article 576 of the Tunisian
code, relating to the sale of a thing belonging to another, as an
example of Islamic legal doctrine being incorporated into the
Tunisian code. 228 According to this article, the sale of a thing
belonging to another is valid: (1) if the true owner of the thing
ratifies the sale; or (2) if the seller then acquires ownership of the
thing. Where the true owner refuses to ratify the sale, the purchaser
may ask for dissolution of the sale. The seller is liable for damages
when the purchaser was unaware at the time of the sale that the
thing belonged to another. The nullification of the contract,
however, can never be opposed by the seller due to the fact that the
thing belonged to another. 229
G. Contract of Exchange
Civil law jurist A.M. Demante, writing in the 19th Century,
noted that the contract of exchange is more ancient than the contact
of sale. 230 While continental civil law recognizes the contract of
sale, so does Islamic law, and the Tunisian code incorporates the
concept of this contract in a way that permits it to comport with
both legal traditions.
Under Tunisian law, a contract of exchange is a contract by
which each party gives to another, as property, a movable or
immovable thing, or an intangible right, against another thing or

227.
228.
229.
230.

MEJELLE, Art. 394.
See Belknani, supra note 34, at 22 n.99.
TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 576.
DEMANTE, supra note 93, at 189.
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right of a similar or of a different nature. 231 This comports with
modern civil codes which retain this nominate contract and tend to
define it as “a contract whereby each party transfers to the other
the ownership of a thing other than money.” 232
Consistent with classical civil law, Tunisian law holds that a
contract of exchange is perfected by the consent of the parties. 233
When, however, the contract of exchange regards buildings or
other objects susceptible to mortgage, the provisions of the
Tunisan code dealing with immoveable property are applicable234
(namely the contract must be made in writing with a date that is
certain and will have no effect vis-à-vis third parties unless it is
registered in the registry of finance, subject to the special
provisions relating to registered buildings). 235
When the exchanged objects are different of values, the parties
are permitted to make up the difference through cash payments or
other objects, at that time or as a future sale. This provision has no
effect between Muslims when the exchanged objects are
commodities. 236 As with contracts of sale, this exception for
Muslims relates to the Islamic rules relating to the sale of
commodities and future contracts, which maintain very specific
requirements which are occasionally at variance with the
continental civil law rules. 237
H. Deposit and Sequestration
A deposit is a contract by which a person surrenders a chattel
to another person who undertakes to keep the deposited thing and
231. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 718.
232. See, e.g., LA CIV. CODE art. 2660.
233. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 719; DEMANTE,
supra note 93, at 189: “Dans les principes de notre Droit français ce contrat est
consensuel aussi bien que la vente.”
234. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 719.
235. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 581.
236. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 720.
237. ABU-MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH BIN ABI-ZAYD & ABDUR-RAHMAN ALQYRAWANI, supra note 212.
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return it in its individuality. 238 A contract of deposit must be made
in writing if it is of a value exceeding one thousand dinars. This
rule does not, however, apply to a necessary deposit which is
defined as one that was forced by a fortuitous event or force
majeure event, such as a fire, a shipwreck or another event, the
proof of which may be made by any means, regardless of the value
of the object of the deposit. 239
A person making or accepting a deposit must have the capacity
to form obligations. 240 If, however, a person able to bind himself
accepts a deposit made by an incapable person, that person is
bound by all obligations arising from the deposit. 241
The depositary is answerable for any foreseeable loss or
damage to the thing when (a) he or she receives a salary for the
custody of the deposit; and/or (b) when he or she receives deposits
as a result of his or her status or according to his or her
functions. 242 The depositary is not answerable for loss or damage
caused (a) by nature or problems with the thing deposited or by the
negligence of the depositor; or (b) in cases of force majeure or
fortuitous events, so long as the depositary has not been already
put in default for failure to return the thing deposited, or so long as
the force majeure is not the depositary’s fault or the fault of
persons for which he is responsible. 243 Proof of force majeure or
defect of the things is the depositary’s burden, when the depositary
receives a salary for the filing or when he received the thing by
virtue of his status or pursuant to his functions. 244 Otherwise, the
depositary shall ensure the custody of the deposit, with the same
diligence that one would apply to things that belong to him. 245
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Under Tunisian law, any agreement is void in which the
depositary would be held responsible for fortuitous events or force
majeure, except in certain circumstances, including those where
the depositary receives a salary. 246 This last provision only applies
between non-Muslims. 247 This exception for Muslims relates to
Islamic law governing the delivery of things for safe-keeping,
which generally hold a depositary liable for the destruction of the
thing entrusted to him, except for cases of fortuitous events or
force majeure. The Mejelle’s provisions on this topic, for instance,
provide that “if the contract for delivery [for safekeeping] has been
made for payment to be made for the safe keeping, in case it is
destroyed or wasted by a cause which it is possible to guard
against, it becomes a cause of compensation.” 248 When, however,
the loss is not something that could be guarded against, then the
general rule applies that “if it be destroyed or wasted without any
[fault] of the person who accepts it and without any fault in the
keeping of it, it does not become necessary to make
compensation.” 249 In providing an exception to the civil law rule,
the Tunisian code permits this Islamic rule to become operational
between Muslims.
I. Mandate
Under Tunisian law, a mandate can be special or general. 250 A
special mandate is one that is given for one or more specified
endeavors, or which confers only specific powers. 251 It gives
power to act in specified endeavors and matters necessarily
attendant thereto, according to the nature of the matter. 252 A
general mandate, in contrast, is one which gives the mandatary the
246.
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TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 1023.
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power to manage all the interests of the principal without limit, or
which confers broad powers without limit in a particular case. 253 It
gives the power to do all that is in the interests of the principal,
according to the nature of the case and the usage of trade, and
especially to recover what is due, to pay debts, to carry out
conservatory acts, to bring possessory actions, and even enter into
obligations to the extent necessary to carry out the affairs for
which the principal is responsible. 254
With regard to the sources of law used for the Tunisian rules on
mandate, Belknani highlights article 1163 as an example of the
integration of Islamic law into the Tunisian code. 255 According to
that article, the total or partial revocation of the mandate cannot
have effect toward third parties of good faith who have contracted
with the mandatary before the revocation, except for the principal’s
recourse against the mandatary. 256 When the law prescribes a
determined form for the establishment of the mandate, the same
form is required for revocation. 257
A review of the provisions of the Mejelle reveal similar
provisions regarding vekyalet—a contract in which a person
appoints another to conduct affairs on his or her behalf. 258 Those
provisions make clear that the excesses of the person so appointed
(the vekyl) do not prejudice third parties but, instead, inure to the
detriment of the vekyl. 259
J. Oaths (Les Serments)
Another area where the gravitational pull of Islamic law and
Tunisian custom is evident is in the rules governing oaths.
Continental civil law recognizes, among other things, the use of
253.
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oaths as a manner of proving the existence of facts relevant to civil
litigation. For instance, Article 1357 of the French Civil Code
provides for the use of judicial oaths (le serment). This has been
described as “a remnant of the formalistic medieval procedure”
which is used less frequently today. 260 There are three varieties of
such judicial oaths in French civil law: the decisory oath (serment
décisoire), the supplementary oath (serment supplétoire), and the
serment in litem or serment in plaids which deals with damages.
The first of these (the serment décisoire) is an oath
administered by one party to the other, upon which the result of the
action is made to depend. 261 The serment supplétoire is the oath
administered by the judge to one of the parties in order to
determine an issue. 262 The last variety (serment en plaids, or
serment in litem) is a kind of oath in which, under certain
exceptional circumstances, the judge may to administer to a
plaintiff in order to determine the value of the thing forming the
object of the action. 263
Tunisian law also recognizes two types of oaths for purposes of
establishing facts in civil litigation: (1) one which a party refers to
the other in order to make the case depend upon it (décisoire); and
(2) one which is brought ex officio by the judges to one or the other
of parties (supplétoire). 264 Although a lengthy discussion of these
devices is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that
Tunisian civil law incorporates them, but also imbues them with a
260. See PETER EMILIUS HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 358 (1967).
261. OLIVER EATON BODINGTON, AN OUTLINE OF THE FRENCH LAW OF
EVIDENCE 72-73 (1904). Writing in 1904, Oliver Eaton Bodington noted that
“the serment décisoire, or oath administered by one party to the other, may be
administered by any party who has proof to make in support of his demand, or
of his plea in defence.” Importantly, such an oath can be made in a variety of
judicial contests but can only be made in regard only to “things done by the
person himself, or at the doing of which he was present.” Bodington also noted
that French courts and commentators have universally held “that the oath can
only be administered in regard to facts which are of a decisive character, that is
to say, a character which shall determine the issue.”
262. Id. at 72-73.
263. Id.
264. TUNISIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, Art. 492.

46

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 7

religious dimension that does not ordinarily exist in continental
civil law. Specifically, Article 495 of the Tunisian code notes that
“[t]he oath must always be taken in the mosque on Friday or in any
other religious place which will be indicated by the party offering
the oath and in conformance with the religious sect of the
party.” 265 If the place where the oath must be taken is further than
three miles from the place where the Court sits, the part to which
the oath is referred may refuse to go there. Notably, the party who
refuses to be sworn in the indicated place is deemed to have
refused the oath. 266 Such provisions—requiring an oath to be taken
“in the mosque on Friday or in any other religious place”—imbues
this procedure with a religious element that gives recognition to the
role of religion in civil affairs.
K. Mouçakâte and Moughâraça
The Tunisian code’s inclusion of the Islamic concepts of
mouçakâte and moughâraça are also examples of how Islamic
influences can sometimes become dominant traits within the codal
text, especially in the code’s treatment of agricultural contracts. 267
With regard to the first of these, the Tunisian civil code
incorporates the device of a mouçakâte defining it as a contract by
which the owner of a crop which is ready for cultivation charges
another person, referred to as a colon, to do the necessary work of
picking or harvesting in exchange for a determined share of the
harvest. 268 This sort of arrangement is derived from the Islamic
legal arrangement with the same name, also transliterated as
musaqah or musāqāt, which is generally defined as a type of
contract in which “an owner of trees or crops entrusts his trees or
crops to a person to look after and water them until they bear fruit
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or ripen [in exchange for] a specific portion of such fruit or
crops.” 269
The Tunisian code also incorporates the device known as
moughâraça, which it defines as a contract which forms an entity
which has for its object the fruit trees or other crops with regard to
which one of the parties, known as the colon, is responsible for
their planting and care in exchange for an undivided share of the
land and soil and the trees or crops. 270 This is obviously derived
from the Islamic property device of the same name—also
transliterated as mugharisah or magharisah—which endows the
lessee with real rights and is typically defined as “a contract by
virtue of which an owner entrusts land to a person who undertakes
to plant it with fruit trees [in exchange for] receiving a portion of
the land.” 271
Professor Lisa Anderson provides some context for how such a
contract would order society in rural North Africa:
In both Tunisia and Libya, the Sahil was often home of a
contract known as the magharisah, in which property was
confided to a land-poor farmer for development; upon its
harvest, he was to receive half the land as his own. This
type of contract was particularly characteristic of the treecrop regions, where the first harvest of marketable produce
was sometimes decades from planting. The magharsi—the
developer—was tied to the landowner by numerous
personal obligations. During the tenure of the contract, he
was often obliged to ask for advances in money or in kind
from the landowner, much of which he would not be able to
return until the expiration of the agreement, and even then,
he might find himself better served by a renewal of the
contract than under the obligation to repay his debts. 272
Inclusion of such traditional Islamic legal devices demonstrates
the way in which Santillana sought to directly instill certain aspects
269.
(1979).
270.
271.
272.
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of Islamic law into the Tunisian code and to preserve both a sense
of tradition, historicity, and legal continuity in its text.
IV. CONCLUSION
Tunisia is now emerging as a model for Arab Spring countries
seeking a successful transition to democracy. Its recent success in
completing its new, post-revolution constitution demonstrates its
leading role in the region. As such, legal developments within
Tunisia carry the potential for regional impact as other countries
seek to emulate its successful transition. 273 Political contention
relating to the role of Islamic law in post-revolution Tunisia,
however, will not cease simply because a new constitution is now
in force. 274 Rather, the issues of concern to Islamists in Tunisia and
more secular Tunisians will continue to be debated in the corridors
of Tunisia’s newly democratic institutions. 275 Understanding that
debate as it relates to Tunisian law necessarily requires an
understanding of the domestic law in force in Tunisia, its sources,
and its compatibility with Islamic law.
As this article has demonstrated, the fact that Tunisia’s new
constitution contains no express reference to Islamic law does not
mean that Islamic law plays no role in Tunisia. 276 To the contrary,
an analysis of Tunisian civil law demonstrates the historic and
continuing presence of Islamic legal influence in Tunisian civil
law. Importantly, this influence—which spans the history of
modern Tunisia—has not been a negative aspect or a harmful
element. Rather, the Tunisian code demonstrates how Islamic law
can function in a modern context alongside continental civil law as
part of a mixed jurisdiction in which domestic civil law is derived
273. See Woodruff, supra note 22.
274. See Ghribi, supra note 26.
275. See supra note 22; see also HAMOUDI, supra note 89, at 226: “Tunisia,
for example, appears deeply split between a moderate Islamist movement that
seeks a more enhanced role for Islam, and a strong secular movement
significantly influenced by Tunisia’s recent past, which regards such aspirations
with uncommon fear.”
276. See supra note 1.
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from a multiplicity of sources, 277 namely the French civil code, 278
the German civil code, 279 several schools of Islamic jurisprudence
(especially the Malikite and Hanafite schools), 280 the Mejelle, 281
Tunisian custom, French jurisprudence, and the jurisprudence of
French courts which were active in Tunisia during its time as a
French protectorate. 282 Equilibrium between continental civil law
and Islamic law was achieved in that code through direct
incorporation of Islamic law and Islamic legal devices into the
codal text; exploiting the natural parallelisms that exist between
Islamic law and continental civil law; excepting Muslims from
aspects of the civil law which might violate the tenets of Islamic
law; and through imparting a religious dimension to otherwise
secular legal devices. The result is a codification of civil law which
adheres to the modern civil law model inspired by the French civil
code, but which is also uniquely Tunisian—and uniquely wellsuited to the task of ordering plurality in Tunisia in the aftermath
of the Jasmine revolution.
Understanding this aspect of Tunisian civil law informs our
understanding of the ongoing debates surrounding the role of
Islamic law in post-revolution Tunisia and the significance of
constitutional references to Islamic law or the lack thereof. Islamic
law has, to some extent, been a part of Tunisian civil law for over
100 years and, because Islamic law is interwoven into the fiber of
Tunisia’s foundational legal texts, it will continue to be part of
Tunisian civil law under the aegis of the new constitution. As with
other countries, however, its compatibility with Islamic law and its
incorporation of traditional Tunisian legal devices in the context of
a modern civil code has doubtlessly contributed to its institutional
durability, and durable institutions of that nature will be needed to
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maintain stability in a region undergoing such dramatic social and
political upheaval. As Béatrice Hibou noted in the preface to the
English edition of her excellent work on Tunisia entitled The Force
of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia:
What is happening in Tunisia is important, over and above
what this country in North Africa actually represents, with
its small population, lacking any income derived from
economy, energy sources or geopolitical clout, or any
dominant position in the region. These days it benefits from
the impact of the Tunisian ‘revolution’ on the rest of the
region, in Egypt, of course, but also elsewhere in the Arab
world and sub-Saharan Africa. But history has already
shown how this ‘little country’ could serve as an
example. 283
The fact that Tunisia’s mixed civil law system has persisted for
over a century (and remains a celebrated facet of the country’s
legal culture) provides reason for optimism as Tunisia moves
forward in its transition to democracy. Moreover, other countries
in the region may also benefit from the Tunisian experience—the
example of this “little country” which has changed the
physiognomy of the Middle East and North Africa at almost every
level—as they look to develop civil laws which are modern, yet
compatible with their legal traditions, customs, and Islamic legal
precepts. As noted in this article, it would not be the first time that
this small country on the Mediterranean coast illuminated a path
for others to follow.
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